[rrg] ILNP Identifiers

[Xu Xiaohu]

> (For example, one hopes that a HIP ID is computationally 
> infeasible to forge without compromising the originating key, 
> but every deployed cryptographic system I know of does 
> eventually suffer key compromise, at which point that HIP ID 
> would not be globally unique either.)

Even the cryptographically generated ID suffers ID theft/forgery, then what
about the ordinay ID without such security mechanism?
 
> > If so, would you please explain the reason?
> 
> Any proposal has to handle the case where some bad party is 
> deliberately mis-using an Identifier (or Address) that is not 
> really theirs.  This case is not new to Routing RG, instead 
> this is exactly like the situation in today's deployed IP 
> Internet with forged Source IP Addresses. [US CERT: CA 1995-01]

Yes. However, the id/locator split will make the situation worse if no
special security mechanism is taken. 

Best regards,

Xiaohu