[rrg] Small v Large networks [Re: Renumbering can never be secure, testable, reliable or routine - draft-carpenter-renum-needs-work]

[Brian E Carpenter]

On 2008-10-28 04:33, William Herrin wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 27, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Robin Whittle <rw at firstpr.com.au> wrote:
>>  I don't support the scaling problem being solved just for "small" networks, however defined,
> 
> Agree.
> 
>> differently for "small" and "large" networks.
> 
> Disagree. There's a money issue here: large networks can afford and
> are willing to spend more money on multihoming than small networks.
> There's no reason that both should be constrained to the same solution
> at the same cost. The requirement is that whatever the scaling
> solution, the per-network cost must either be trivial -or- recoverable
> from the networks who instigate it.

I agree with Bill, and it seems to me that there's a fundamental
difference between Eliot's o(10^6) big sites and the much greater
number of small sites. The big ones are very likely to have a DMZ,
run their own servers, and have multiple points of interconnection
around the world. In other words, prime candidates for PI based
addressing and maybe a map/encap style solution.

The small ones are very likely to have a simple firewall/router
combo, outsource their publicly accessible servers, and have a single
point of attachment (or at least, several attachments in a relatively
small geographical area). They are also, I believe, much less likely
to be significantly disturbed by renumbering than the large sites.

I think there's definitely scope for two solutions.

    Brian

> 
> BGP is unacceptable because it costs "the world" about $8000/yr for
> every announced BGP prefix. If there was a way that "the world" could
> recover that $8000 from each of the folks announcing a prefix, our
> problem space would shrink considerably.
> 
> Regards,
> Bill Herrin
> 
>